Presidentes, primeros ministros y designación de ministros outsiders: un análisis cuantitativo longitudinal de catorce países de Europa Central y del Este
Palabras clave:
Ministros, Formación de gabinetes, Asignación de carteras, Ministros outsiders, TecnocraciaResumen
En este artículo se examinan los principios de reclutamiento ministerial en catorce países de Europa Central y del Este (ECE), con un énfasis particular en la selección de ministros sin experiencia partidaria ni parlamentaria (outsiders). El análisis descriptivo del reclutamiento de los gabinetes en catorce países de ECE entre 1991 y 2012 revela que aproximadamente la mitad de los ministros eran outsiders. Examino las posibles razones para la selección de ministros outsiders, así como los factores que determinan su nombramiento en los gabinetes. Los resultados de una regresión binaria multinivel muestran que la probabilidad de nombrar ministros outsiders es alta en sistemas semipresidenciales, en gabinetes interinos, en parlamentos altamente fraccionalizados, y si hay pathdependency en el reclutamiento de ministros outsiders inmediatamente después del colapso del comunismo. Asimismo, muestro que el nombramiento de ministros outsiders tiende a ser tecnocrático, y que predomina en las carteras de finanzas y economía, así como en relaciones exteriores y defensa. Finalmente, argumento que el creciente reclutamiento de ministros outsiders en los gabinetes de los países de ECE es principalmente generado desde el lado de la demanda —los presidentes, primeros ministros y (hasta cierto punto) los partidos políticos— antes que desde los candidatos outsiders.Citas
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